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Dear Sir or Madam:   
 
Please see the submission below in response to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s 
Request for Information (RFI) Regarding Bureau Data Collections (Docket No. CFPB-2018-
0031).   We are legal scholars and former regulators specializing in consumer financial 
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Comment of Legal Scholars and Former Regulators  
on Docket No. CFPB-2018-0031 
 
In this Request for Information (RFI), the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB or the 
Bureau) seeks public comment on “the overall efficien y and effectiveness of the Bureau’s . . . 
Data Collections in support of the Bureau’s work.”1  In connection with this RFI, the Bureau 
states that it “is considering whether any changes to it  . . . Data Collections would be 
appropriate.”2  The CFPB does not shed light on the changes that it is considering.  The RFI’s 
repeated references to reporting burdens and unsubstantiated privacy concerns send strong 
signals, however, that the Bureau is contemplating s gnificant cutbacks to data collections and 
strict limits on data reuse in the name of reducing industry burden.   
 
Major curtailments to the Bureau’s data collections a d restrictions on its current reuse would 
undermine the Bureau’s ability to fulfill its statutory mission to protect consumers.  For that 
reason, we oppose any such cutbacks and restrictions. 
 
I.  The CFPB’s Statutory Mission Necessitates the Scope and Robustness of Its 
Data Collections Activities  
 
The CFPB does not collect data for the sake of colle ting data.  Rather, it gathers data in order to 
fulfill its fundamental statutory obligation to protect consumers.3  Any reevaluation of the 
CFPB’s data collections activities must therefore ensure that the Bureau continues to gather the 
full data needed to protect the financial safety of U.S. families. 
 
Consumer financial protection is the overarching statutory mission of the CFPB and therefore the 
defining purpose of the CFPB’s data collections activities.  Specifically, in the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), Congress defined the CFPB’s 
purpose as follows:4   
 
• One, to “ensur[e] that all consumers have access to markets for consumer financial 
products and services”; and  
• Two, to ensure “that markets for consumer financial products and services are fair, 
transparent, and competitive.” 
 
The Dodd-Frank Act goes on to charge the CFPB with “implement[ing] and, where applicable, 
enforc[ing] Federal consumer financial law consistently for the purpose of” of fulfilling those 
twin statutory goals.5 
 
                                                 
1  Bureau of  Consumer Financial Protection, Request for Information Regarding Bureau Data Collections, 
83 Fed. Reg. 49072, 49072 (Sept. 28, 2018) [hereinaft r RFI]. 
2  Id. 
3  In certain cases, the Bureau also collects data pursuant to an independent statutory directive.  The most 
prominent example involves data collection under th Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-28 0. 
4  Id. § 5511(a). 
5  Id. 
3 
 
In furtherance of the CFPB’s statutory mission to ensure consumer financial protection, the 
Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the Bureau “to exercise it  authorities under Federal consumer 
financial law” to achieve these five statutory objectives:6 
 
• First, that “consumers are provided with timely and understandable information to make 
responsible decisions about financial transactions”; 
• Second, that “consumers are protected from unfair, deceptiv, or abusive acts and 
practices and from discrimination”; 
• Third, that “outdated, unnecessary, or unduly burdensome regulations are regularly 
identified and addressed in order to reduce unwarranted regulatory burdens”; 
• Fourth, that “Federal consumer financial law is enforced consistently, without regard to 
the status of a person as a depository institution, in order to promote fair competition”; 
and 
• Fifth, that “markets for consumer financial products and services operate transparently 
and efficiently to facilitate access and innovation.” 
 
Any proposal to restrict the Bureau’s data collections and data reuse must therefore be evaluated 
in light of the CFPB’s statutory purpose and five statutory objectives.   When the Bureau’s 
purpose and statutory objectives are considered together, these are the criteria against which any 
proposed cutbacks and reuse limitations must be judged: 
 
• Will cuts to data collections or restrictions on data reuse make it harder to ensure that 
“consumers have access to markets for consumer financial products and services”?   
• Without the same robust level of data collections ad reuse, will it be harder for the 
CFPB to ensure that consumer financial markets “are fai , transparent, and competitive”? 
• In a similar vein, will new limits on data gathering and sharing harm the Bureau’s ability 
to ensure that  “markets for consumer financial products and services operate 
transparently and efficiently to facilitate access and innovation”? 
• Will it be harder for the Bureau to provide consumers “with timely and understandable 
information to make responsible decisions about financial transactions” if data are 
curtailed?   
• Will new data restrictions impede the CFPB’s ability to protect consumers from “unfair, 
deceptive, or abusive acts and practices and from discrimination”?; and 
• Will future strictures on data collections and reuse hamper the CFPB’s ability to 
consistently enforce Federal consumer financial law “without regard to the status  
of a person as a depository institution, in order to promote fair competition”? 
 
Unless the CFPB can answer each of those questions with an unequivocal “no,” it lacks 
justification to scale back the CFPB’s current vigorous level of data collections and its sensible 
protocols governing reuse. 
 
To be sure, Congress in the Dodd-Frank Act instructed the Bureau to identify and address 
“outdated, unnecessary, or unduly burdensome regulations . . . in order to reduce unwarranted 
regulatory burdens.”  That injunction assumes, however, that the Bureau first fulfills its statutory 
                                                 
6  Id. § 5511(b). 
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obligation to protect the financial safety of consumers.  Reducing regulatory burden is not and 
must not be an objective in and of itself.  To the contrary, if new restrictions on data collections 
and reuse would impede the CFPB’s ability to protect consumers—as we maintain it will, for the 
reasons we describe below—then the question is settled and the Bureau may not scale back its 
current commitment to robust data collections and responsible data reuse.   
 
It is equally important that any future consideration of data curtailments be handled with full 
transparency.  In this regard, we are concerned about the lack of process surrounding Bureau’s 
decision earlier this year to issue an interpretive and procedural rule excusing most mortgage 
lenders from reporting the discretionary data points added to Home Mortgage Disclosure Act’s 
data points pursuant to Dodd-Frank in 2015.7   Despite its obligation to evaluate the potential 
costs and benefits of that exemption under Section 1022(b)(2)(A) of Dodd-Frank—and despite 
the extensive cost-benefit analysis to the contrary in the original rule--the Bureau issued this 
year’s exemption with no quantitative analysis whatsoever of the ensuing costs and benefits.  
The scant cost-benefit discussion in the preamble to that exemption was mostly conclusory and 
focused on the benefits to regulated entities (“covered persons”).  The only discussion in the 
preamble of the effect on consumers was a throwaway line saying, “this rulemaking is expected 
to have negligible impact on consumers, in terms of either costs or benefits.”8  To compound 
matters, the Bureau  made the exemption immediately effective, with no prior notice or 
opportunity for public comment.9   
 
The handling of this exemption is highly troubling because it reversed a final rule on data 
collections without evaluating that decision in terms of the purpose or statutory objectives of the 
CFPB.  We have added reservations that the HMDA exemption process violated the impact 
analysis requirements of Dodd-Frank and the procedural requirements of the Administrative 
Procedure Act.  The experience with the HMDA exemption raises serious concerns that the 
Bureau will revisit its other data collection activities in an equally casual manner.   In view of 
these concerns, it is imperative that any proposal to further curtail the Bureau’s data collections 
and data reuse be conducted in a public and fully transparent manner.  To do so, any such 
proposal needs to undergo rigorous empirical analysis of the effect on the Bureau’s core mission 
and provide the public with a meaningful opportunity for prior comment. 
 
II.  Evidence-Based Decision-Making Is a Bedrock Principle of the Bureau 
 
Since it came into existence, the CFPB has refrained from intervening in markets based on 
doctrine or ideology.  Instead, the Bureau has conducted regulation strictly based on rigorous 
                                                 
7  See Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, Partial Exemptions From the Requirements of the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act Under the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act 
(Regulation C):  Interpretive and procedural rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 45,325, 45,328-29 (Sept. 7, 2018); see also Bureau 
of Consumer Financial Protection, Home Mortgage Disclosure (Regulation C):  Final rules; official interpretations, 
80 Fed. Reg. 66,128 (Oct. 28, 2015), amended, Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, Home Mortgage 
Disclosure (Regulation C), 82 Fed. Reg. 43,088 (Sept. 13, 2017).   
8  See 83 Fed. Reg. at 45331-32.   
9  See id. at 45331. 
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empirical analysis of the facts.  This record is a product of the steadfast commitment the CFPB 
made from its inception to neutral, evidence-based decision-making.10   
 
In 2010, Congress made the judgment that the crux of CFPB decision-making had to be data.  
For this reason, Dodd-Frank commands the Bureau to “collect[], research[], monitor[], and 
publish[] information relevant to the functioning of” consumer financial markets “to identify 
risks to consumers and the proper functioning of such markets. . .”11  Numerous other provisions 
in the Dodd-Frank Act authorize the Bureau to collect data in order to discharge its 
responsibilities to the public.12 
 
This data-driven tradition is the linchpin of the Bureau’s operations and its success in protecting 
consumers.  It ensures that consumer harms will be dentified and the extent of those problems 
gauged.  At the same time, it ensures that the Bureau will not intervene unless there is a problem, 
that the Bureau knows exactly what problem needs to be solved, and that any intervention will be 
tailored to the issue at hand.  None of this is possible without the appropriate data.  Data are what 
enable the Bureau to fulfill its responsibility to protect consumers while avoiding unnecessary 
regulatory burden and market distortions. 
 
This commitment to empirically-based policymaking is hard-wired into the very structure of the 
Bureau, pursuant to Dodd-Frank.  The Act expressly in tructs the Director to establish a research 
                                                 
10  See generally Leonard Kennedy, Patricia A. McCoy & Ethan Bernstein, The Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau: Financial Regulation for the 21st Century, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1141, 1155-58 (2012), for a 
discussion of the Bureau’s commitment to data-driven analysis. 
11  12 U.S.C. § 5511(c)(3); see also id. § 5512(c) (mandating CFPB monitoring for rulemaking purposes and 
otherwise). 
12  See, e.g., Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, Sources and Uses of Data at the Bureau of Consumer 
Financial Protection 26-27 (Sept. 2018), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/d cuments/bcfp_sources-uses-of-data.pdf [hereinafter Data 
Report]; Dodd-Frank Act § 1447 (default and foreclosure database); 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act data collection), 5107-5108 (backup a thority to establish loan originator licensing system and 
nationwide mortgage licensing and registry system), 5493(b)(3)(A) (mandate to establish a consumer complaint 
database), 5511(c)(2) (collecting consumer complaints), 5512(c)(4) (“the Bureau shall have the authoriy to gather 
information from time to time regarding the organizat on, business conduct, markets, and activities of covered 
persons and service providers”), 5512(c)(5) (the CFPB may gather information to determine whether a nonbank 
provider is a covered person), 5512(c)(6)(B) (access by the Bureau to reports of other regulators), 5512(c)(7)(B) 
(public disclosure of nonbanks’ registration information), 5514(b)(1) (supervisory collection of information through 
reports and examinations of non-depository providers), 5514(b)(4) (CFPB use of information on nonbank providers 
from public sources and reports by other regulators), 5515(b)(1) (supervisory collection of information through 
reports and examinations of very large depository institutions and credit unions), 5515(b)(3) (CFPB use of 
information on very large depository institutions and credit unions from public sources and reports by other 
regulators), 5516(b) (access to reports on smaller depository institutions and credit unions), 5514-5516 (authorizing 
the Bureau to require financial institutions to provide data in response to supervisory requests), 5517(n)(2) 
(permissible CFPB information requests of certain service providers), 5534 (authorizing the Bureau to require 
financial institutions to provide data in response to consumer complaints), 5536(a)(2) (making it illegal for covered 
persons and service providers to fail or refuse to make reports or provide information to the Bureau), 5562-5563 
(subpoena, civil investigative demand, and other information gathering powers for purposes of CFPB investigations 
and enforcement); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1632(d)(2) (authorizing the Bureau to require financial institutions to pr vide data 
on consumer credit card agreements), 1637(r)(2) (authorizing the Bureau to require financial institutions to provide 
data on college credit card marketing agreements), 1646(b) (authorizing the Bureau to require financial institutions 
to provide data on the terms of credit card plans), 1691c-2(f) (small business loan data collection), 1701-1720 
(authorizing the Bureau to require financial institutions to provide data on land sales agreements). 
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function and makes that operation responsible for “researching, analyzing, and reporting” on 
consumer financial markets, market developments and their effects, and consumer behavior 
when using financial products.13  The Bureau houses its research operations in two types of 
teams within its Regulations, Markets, and Research Division (RMR).  The research team, which 
is staffed with respected Ph.D. economists, behavior l scientists, and data analysts, conducts 
neutral quantitative and qualitative research on topics in consumer finance, including firm 
behavior, household decision-making, and welfare-enhancing regulation.14  Meanwhile, the 
markets teams in RMR monitor consumer financial markets and conduct evidence-based policy 
analysis on markets including mortgages, credit cards, small dollar lending, student loans, 
deposits, debt collection, and credit reporting.15  These teams work closely together and with 
other CFPB regulators in rulemaking, consumer education, supervision and enforcement.   
 
By necessity, data are the lifeblood of the Bureau’s markets analytics, research, consumer 
education, supervision, and enforcement activities.  The Bureau draws on a broad range of 
quantitative and qualitative data to tackle analytical questions.  The research economists and 
markets experts in RMR analyze large data sets, some assembled by the federal government16 
and others purchased from private vendors.17  Their work is supplemented with qualitative 
analysis and field insights from CFPB examinations, consumer complaints, public comments, 
and other sources,18 which are used, among other things, to spot emerging issues for further 
research.   
 
In some cases, the Bureau collects new data and creates new datasets in order to monitor 
markets, understand consumer decisions, or evaluate anecdotal reports of consumer harm.19  
Before the creation of the Bureau, the available data to analyze many consumer financial issues 
were woefully inadequate.  Without improved data, the Bureau would face a Hobson’s choice of 
regulating based on uncertainty or doing nothing when confronted with serious consumer 
                                                 
13  12 U.S.C. § 5493(b)(1). 
14  See Kennedy et al., supra note 10, at 1155. 
15  See id.  Separately, the Bureau’s Academic Research Council, comprised of leading economists and other 
experts, advises RMR on research methodologies, data collection, and analytic design.  Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, Semi-annual report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, October 1, 2016-March 31, 
2017, at 56 (Spring 2017) [hereinafter March 2017 Semi-annual Report]; see also Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau, Academic Research Council, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/advisory-groups/academic-
research-council/.  For examples of such recommendations, see Annual report of the Academic Research Council, 
October 1, 2016-September 30, 2017, at 6-7 (2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/advisory-
groups/academic-research-council/ (viewed Apr. 30, 2018). 
16  Data Report, supra note 12, at 22-24.  Examples include the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act dataset and 
the National Mortgage Database.  See Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), HMDA & PMIC 
Data Products, https://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/hmdaproducts.htm (viewed Apr. 30, 2018); Federal Housing Finance 
Agency, National Mortgage Database (NMDB®), 
https://www.fhfa.gov/PolicyProgramsResearch/Programs/Pages/National-Mortgage-Database.aspx (viewed Apr. 30, 
2018). 
17  See Data Report, supra note 12, at 24-26.  The Bureau also draws on public data and data collected from 
financial institutions and consumers.  Id. at 21-22, 26-28.  See id. at 21-28 for a comprehensive description of the 
data sources used by the Bureau. 
18  See, e.g., Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, How We Use Complaint Data, 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaint/data-use/ (vi wed Apr. 30, 2018); March 2017 Semi-annual Report, 
supra note 15, at 64. 
19  See, e.g., Data Report, supra note 12, at 26-28. 
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injuries.  Collecting new data to shed light on these areas of uncertainty enables the Bureau to 
avoid this type of a no-win choice. 
 
To summarize, the breadth and depth of the data the CFPB collects are essential to making sure 
that CFPB policymaking is evidence-based and not ideologically driven.  Without that data, the 
Bureau could not protect consumers. 
 
III.  Any Material Reduction in the Current Level of Data Collections and Data 
Reuse at the Bureau Will Hamstring the Agency’s Abil ty to Protect Consumers 
 
Each of the CFPB’s core functions—monitoring, rulemaking, supervision, enforcement, 
consumer education, and consumer complaints—critically depends on data collections to do its 
job.  Moreover, each of these functions depends on data shared by other CFPB offices and other 
state and federal regulators to carry out its mission.  Any unnecessary constraints on data flows 
into and within the Bureau would jeopardize the CFPB’s ultimate responsibility to safeguard the 
welfare of consumers. 
 
a. Curtailing Data Collections Would Undermine the Bureau’s Ability to 
Safeguard Consumers 
 
In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress directed the CFPB to carry out six core functions in order to 
protect consumers.  Rulemaking, supervision, enforcement, financial education, and collecting 
and responding to consumer complaints make up the first five.20  The sixth, as previously noted, 
consists of “collecting, researching, monitoring, and publishing information relevant to the 
functioning of markets for consumer financial products and services to identify risks to 
consumers and the proper functioning of such markets.”21  This data collection function is 
essential both for monitoring and for the successful execution of the first five functions. 
 
Without the requisite data, CFPB monitoring, rulemaking, supervision, enforcement, financial 
education, and consumer complaints would be immobilized.  In December 2017, we got a 
glimpse of the paralysis that a data crackdown would induce when the then-Acting Director 
Mick Mulvaney imposed a temporary freeze on data colle tion within the Bureau.22  While the 
data freeze was in effect, it was impossible for at le st three of the CFPB’s three empirically 
oriented groups to carry out their responsibilities.  The data freeze shuttered the Extranet, which 
CFPB examiners depended on to upload company data in dvance of examinations.  This 
crippled supervision’s ability to conduct examinations and analyze trends.  Meanwhile, the 
Bureau’s enforcement attorneys were barred from reviewing electronic evidence produced in 
discovery, which hampered enforcement.23   The action also stopped the research team from the 
                                                 
20  12 U.S.C. § 5511(c). 
21  Id. § 5511(c)(3). 
22  For further discussion of the temporary freeze, se  page 14 infra. 
23  See Jesse Eisinger, The CFPB’s Declaration of Independence, PROPUBLICA, Feb. 15, 2018; James Kim & 
Bowen “Bo” Ranney, CFPB data collection freeze impacting CFPB examinations, Consumer Finance Monitor 
(Ballard Spahr, Dec. 15, 2017); Letter from Sen. Elizabeth Warren to Leandra English & Mick Mulvaney 2-4 (Jan. 
4, 2018), 
https://www.housingwire.com/ext/resources/files/Editorial/2018_01_04_Letter_to_English_and_Mulvaney_on_CFP
B_Data_Collection.pdf [hereinafter Warren letter]. 
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long-planned onboarding of data that were necessary to carry out the five-year lookback reviews 
of certain rulemakings mandated by Congress in the Dodd-Frank Act.24  The data freeze was just 
a preview of what would happen if data flows were halted permanently. 
 
Monitoring is an obvious area where data flows are crucial.  In Dodd-Frank, Congress directed 
the CFPB to track consumer finance markets and identify risks to consumers.  Needless to say, 
monitoring without data would amount to no real monit ring at all.  In turn, ineffective 
monitoring would have serious negative repercussion f r rulemaking, consumer education, 
supervision, and enforcement, because those functions w uld break down without the insights 
that continuous monitoring provides.   
 
Data analysis similarly forms the bedrock of CFPB rulemaking.  In advance of virtually all of its 
major proposed rulemakings, the Bureau traditionally has conducted in-depth empirical analyses 
of consumer financial markets and the ensuing benefits and any harms to consumers.25  
Importantly, where the Bureau’s rulemaking authority is discretionary, the agency has not pre-
judged the need for a rule.  Instead, RMR has conducte  economic studies of the market in 
question, following consultation with industry, academia, think tanks, consumer groups and 
others, to evaluate whether a rule should even be considered in light of the competing benefits 
and costs.  If a discretionary rulemaking moves forward, the Bureau typically has run additional 
empirical analyses to pinpoint how the market failed and to evaluate competing approaches for 
how to fix it.26  None of these evaluations would have been possible without the necessary data. 
 
Likewise, data are the sine qua non of the impact analyses that the Dodd-Frank Act requir s for 
CFPB rulemakings.  Section 1022(b)(2) of Dodd-Frank mandates the principal impact analysis, 
known as the “Section 1022(b)(2) Analysis,” and describes the cost-benefit analysis that the 
Bureau must conduct:27 
 
 In prescribing a rule under the Federal consumer financial laws— 
(A)  the Bureau shall consider— 
(i) the potential benefits and costs to consumers and covered persons, 
including the potential reduction of access by consumers to consumer 
financial products or services resulting from such rule; and 
                                                 
24  12 U.S.C. § 5512(d). 
25  See generally Comment of Financial Regulation and Consumer Protecti n Scholars  
And Former Regulators on Docket No. CFPB-2018-0009, at 11-13 (June 7, 2018), 
https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cfpb-comments/6/ [hereinafter June 7 Comment].  The ability-to-repay rule was a 
special case.  Because the Bureau inherited that rulemaking from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, which had issued the proposed rule, this init al research occurred both at the Bureau and at the Federal 
Reserve. 
26  These analyses build on an existing foundation of the ongoing monitoring of consumer financial markets 
for developments and any risks to consumers required by 12 U.S.C. § 5512(c). 
27  Id. § 5512(b)(2).  That provision requires the Bureau to “consider” potential benefits and costs, but does not 
require the Bureau to calculate net benefit.  See id.   
 In addition, the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612, requires the CFPB to consider whether its 
proposed and final rules would have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entiti s.   
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(ii)  the impact of proposed rules on covered persons, as described in 
section 1026,28 and the impact on consumers in rural areas . . . 
 
These impact analyses require intensive data analysis of the respective costs and benefits of 
prospective rules. 
 
Nor does rulemaking stop with the issuance and imple entation of a final rule.  Under Dodd-
Frank, the CFPB has a statutory obligation to carry out five-year lookback reviews of every 
significant rule that it issues.29  At least two of those assessments are ongoing right now, one of 
the ability to repay/qualified mortgage rule and the other of the mortgage servicing rule.  These 
assessments would be impossible without the onboarding and analysis of major datasets. 
 
The Bureau does not limit empirical analysis to its rulemaking and monitoring activities.  
Supervision uploads data from covered persons and service providers via the Extranet in advance 
of examinations and conducts voluminous empirical an lysis of that and other data to detect and 
understand trends in the field.  Enforcement collects and analyzes data in the course of 
investigations and discovery to evaluate whether action should be taken and, if so, what type.  
Financial education collects and analyzes information for understanding of consumer decisions 
and for dissemination to consumers.  And consumer response requires the collection of 
voluminous data in the form of consumer complaints. 
 
Here, it is also important to stress that the Burea needs the continued ability to collect new data 
whenever necessary to analyze new questions and evaluate future risks.  Financial services 
markets are constantly evolving and the CFPB needs the flexibility to gather new data points 
from industry participants and consumers whenever ne ded to understand new developments.   
In particular, fintech is an area where the potential risks are not well understood while the field 
generally flies under regulators’ radar screen.  It will be essential for the Bureau to be able to 
collect new types of data to stay abreast of fintech and other financial innovations as they 
emerge.   
 
Bottom line, the Bureau’s evidence-based approach and its ability to protect consumers depend 
on robust data collections.   Impeding the CFPB’s access to data would impair the Bureau’s 
capability to detect emerging harms, to build an evid ntiary foundation for needed action, to 
provide meaningful redress, and ultimately to discharge its statutory obligation to protect 
consumers.   Under these circumstances, any attempt o curtail data collections must be seen for 
what it is:  as deregulation for its own sake, in disregard for the safety of consumers.       
 
b. Restricting Data Sharing and Reuse Would Harm Consumer Protection 
 
It is common for offices within agencies to share data that are gathered initially by another office 
in order to do their job.  It is similarly common for agencies, including the CFPB, to share data 
with other federal agencies and the states.  To be sure, this sharing raises legitimate data security 
and privacy considerations.  For this reason, the CFPB has put strong cybersecurity and private 
                                                 
28  This refers to depository institutions and credit unions with $10 billion or less in total assets.  12 U.S.C. § 
5516. 
29  Id. § 5512(d). 
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safeguards in place to make sure that data are shard strictly for legitimate purposes and when 
needed to protect consumers, as we discuss in the last section of this comment. 
 
This carefully managed data sharing is important because it maximizes the ability of sister 
offices and agencies to operate effectively, for the reasons we describe.  Additionally, data 
sharing avoids needless expenditures for duplicate purchases of data while reducing regulatory 
burden by shielding regulated entities and consumers from repetitive data requests. 
 
i. Data Sharing Is Essential to the Effective Operation of the CFPB And 
Contemplated by the Dodd-Frank Act 
 
When Congress made the decision to confer monitoring, ulemaking, supervision, enforcement, 
consumer education, and consumer complaint powers on the CFPB, it made a conscious design 
choice meant to strengthen the capabilities of the Bureau to protect consumers.  Data sharing30 is 
key to realizing the potential of that design choice.  The CFPB’s own Data Report, which 
accompanies this RFI, recognized this benefit when it aptly stated:  “The analysis or insights 
derived from the data one Bureau office collects can be useful to inform the work of other office 
in the Bureau.”31 
 
Part of the reason for combining so many functions u der the CFPB’s roof was to take advantage 
of the crucial symbiosis among those functions.  Wecan see this, for example, in Dodd-Frank’s 
directive to the CFPB to share HMDA data with other specified federal regulators to “facilitate 
research, examinations, and enforcement.”32  
 
More generally, data sharing is key to the rich set of other interactions among monitoring, 
rulemaking and supervision.  Monitoring by RMR (as well as by consumer complaints) flags 
issues and trends that supervision may want to scrutinize through off-site data collection and on-
site examinations.33  RMR’s rulemaking activities generate rules that form a key basis for 
supervision’s compliance examinations (with the other basis being observation for any unfair, 
deceptive or abusive acts or practices).  Supervision may also consult with markets in RMR to 
“help inform [s]upervision’s risk-based prioritization and to define the scope of contemplated 
examinations.”34  In some cases, RMR and supervision work together on a discrete project and 
jointly share data for that purpose.35 
 
This interaction between RMR and supervision is a two-way street.  Supervision is in a unique 
position to detect new consumer risks and trends through offsite supervision and periodic 
                                                 
30  The CFPB uses the term “data reuse” relatively narrowly.  There are many types of data sharing within e 
Bureau that the agency does not define as data reuse.  See generally Data Report, supra note 12, at 40-52.  
Accordingly, we will use the term “data sharing” to refer to all joint use of data across one or more divisions at the 
Bureau and with other government entities, whether t at sharing constitutes data reuse. 
31  Id. at 40. 
32  12 U.S.C. § 2804(d). 
33  See Data Report, supra note 12, at 41.  RMR almost never shares raw data with supervision or 
enforcement.  It does share insights and analyses of data, however, with both offices.  See id. at 50. 
34  Id. at 41. 
35  See id.  For instance, research “regularly supports [s]upervision with respect to fair lending examinations 
requiring complex econometric analyses of supervisoy data.”  Id. 
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examinations.  Supervision has also used its authority t  collect data, such as de-identified 
account-level data on credit card practices, payday lo ns, and overdraft usage.36  These 
supervisory data, when shared with RMR subject to access restrictions and approval 
requirements to protect the information’s confidentiality,37 can then tee up questions for future 
RMR monitoring and empirical research studies.  Supervisory data also enable the Bureau to 
update its rules to prevent any new abuses from occurring and to conduct lookback assessments 
of significant rules.38    
 
In these ways, data sharing enables each function—monitoring, rulemaking, and supervision—to 
operate more effectively.  In order for this symbiosis to work, however, RMR and supervision 
must be able to freely share the data they gather and develop, subject to proper data security and 
data privacy safeguards. 
 
Similarly, RMR data flows enable CFPB enforcement to do a better job of protecting 
consumers.39   Research “supports [e]nforcement from time to time on request to provide 
analyses of complex data assets obtained in the course f an investigation.”40  Monitoring by 
RMR and consumer complaints and research and markets analysis provide an important avenue 
for detecting potential enforcement problems and sizing their importance.   
 
Supervision and enforcement enjoy a similarly beneficial interaction.  The CFPB’s supervision 
office has one of the smallest examination forces of any federal agency.41  Nevertheless, the on-
site examinations and off-site monitoring conducted by CFPB supervision are invaluable in 
detecting violations that may require investigation and, ultimately, enforcement action.  
Congress’ decision to endow the CFPB with supervision as well as enforcement powers puts the 
Bureau in a strong position to actively root out problems needing enforcement because it has the 
independent authority to go into companies and examine their practices directly.  Congress 
housed supervision and enforcement side-by-side within the CFPB to facilitate this symbiosis.   
 
Consistent with the traditional practice of all federal banking regulators, CFPB enforcement 
accesses confidential supervisory information to evaluate whether to take action.42  These data 
need to flow freely from supervision to enforcement in order for enforcement to properly do its 
job. 
 
                                                 
36  See id. at 44-46. 
37  See id. at 46. 
38  See id. at 41, 46-49. 
39  Enforcement almost never shares its data with other offices.  Id. at 49, 51.  The few times it did so were 
subject to formal agreements governing the sharing of specific data assets.  Id. at 42, 49-50. 
40  Id. at 41. 
41  See Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors, ___ COLUM. L. REV. ___ App. A (forthcoming 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3168798.  As of year-end 2016, the CFPB had 416 monitoring 
(supervisory) personnel.  Only the Federal Communications Commission and the Federal Trade Commission had 
fewer monitoring staff on that date.  In comparison, the OCC, the FDIC, and the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System had 2715, 2719, and 1382 supervisors respectively at the end of 2016.  Id., App. A at 54-55. 
42  See Data Report, supra note 12, at 43-44.  Only enforcement employees who need the information for 
specific job-related tasks have access to that information.  See id. at 44. 
12 
 
We can see similar data sharing between consumer education and research.  Like other offices 
within the Bureau, these two units have shared data while working together on joint studies. 43  
An example of that data sharing and collaboration is the Financial Well-Being Survey in 
America. 44 
 
In sum, Congress’ decision to endow the CFPB with all six functions of monitoring, rulemaking, 
supervision, consumer education, consumer complaints, a d enforcement vastly enriched its 
ability to define violations, to detect violations when they occur, and to initiate enforcement 
when consumers have suffered harm.  This design substantially strengthened the Bureau’s ability 
to safeguard consumers.  The intent behind that design would be undermined, however, if CFPB 
offices such as supervision and enforcement could not share data. 
 
ii.  Congress Expressly Authorized and Sometimes Mandated Data 
Sharing Among Agencies in the Dodd-Frank Act 
 
In a similar vein, Congress contemplated data sharing between the CFPB and other state and 
federal agencies and officials.  In some cases, it mandated data sharing among agencies.  For 
example, Congress required the CFPB and other supervisors to share examination reports with 
each other and further authorized the sharing of other confidential supervisory information.45  
Congress also required the CFPB to use reports provided to state or federal agencies and publicly 
available information when conducting supervisory activities.46  Elsewhere in the Dodd-Frank 
Act, Congress authorized the CFPB and the federal prudential banking regulators, the Federal 
Trade Commission, other federal agencies, and state agencies to share consumer complaints with 
one another, with the proper safeguards.47  In this additional way, the Dodd-Frank Act expressly 
contemplates broad data sharing to effectuate the mission of the Bureau. 
 
iii.  Sensible Data Sharing Avoids Wasteful Costs While Reducing 
Regulatory Burden 
 
Besides the CFPB’s effectiveness and that of fellow regulators, there are other important reasons 
why data should be and must be shared within the Bur au across division lines.  Data sharing 
eliminates the wasteful expense that would be incurred if multiple offices within the Bureau each 
had to acquire identical data sets.  It would be unconscionable, for example, to require different 
offices of the Bureau to acquire the same proprietary d ta set, when the CFPB could (and 
currently does) acquire a single license for multiple uses across divisions.  Similarly, data sharing 
eliminates multiple, burdensome calls on regulated p rsons and other members of the public for 
the same data.48  It is precisely for that reason, in fact, that Dodd-Frank directs the Bureau to use 
other supervisors’ examination reports in conducting its own supervision. 
 
----------------------------------- 
                                                 
43  Id. at 41. 
44  Id.  
45  12 U.S.C. §§ 5512(c)(6)(B)-(C), 5514(b)(3), 5515(e)(1)(C), 5516(c)(2). 
46  Id. §§ 5514(b)(4), 5515(b)(3). 
47  Id. § 5493(b)(3)(B), (D). 




To appreciate the pivotal role that data sharing plays in the CFPB’s overall effectiveness, it is 
worth considering a few counterfactuals.  What point is supervision if it cannot refer violations 
that it discovers in the course of examinations to enforcement for investigation?  What is the 
point of research if it cannot pinpoint trends for supervision to track?  What will happen to the 
quality of CFPB cost-benefit analysis (which is now housed in the Office of the Director) if it 
cannot use the data collected by RMR?    
 
The short answer to all of these questions is that the effectiveness of these activities will suffer 
and so will the financial welfare of the American consumer.   There is no legitimate reason to 
block the current level of data sharing among the Bureau’s offices and with fellow state and 
federal regulators.  Any effort to do so would be for the purpose of hamstringing the protection 
of consumers. 
 
IV.  Data Security and Data Privacy Are No Justification for Scaling Back Data 
Collections or Sharing at the Bureau 
 
We place extremely high importance on the security and privacy of confidential information 
collected by and maintained by the Bureau.  Data security and privacy are crucial for the safety 
and autonomy of the consumers and regulated entities whose data are collected. 
 
The CFPB has treated these concerns with the utmost seriousness by carefully spelling out 
policies and data governance structures on the intake, storage, and sharing of data.  The Bureau 
instituted a Policy on Information Governance49 and a formal data governance structure50 to 
ensure the security and privacy of the nonpublic data that the Bureau collects and stores.  The 
Bureau has also adopted a Privacy Policy which addresses, among other things, safeguards for 
the data it acquires and protocols to minimize the collection of personally identifiable 
information (PII).51  Together, the Privacy Policy and the Policy on Information Governance 
restrict access to sensitive information to CFPB staff on a need-to-know basis.52 
Meanwhile, confidential information that is provided to the CFPB by other agencies is treated 
according to the CFPB’s and the other agency’s “applicable regulations regarding the treatment 
of confidential information.”53  Normally, access to and sharing of those data “are restricted in 
accordance” with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the two agencies.54 
 
The CFPB’s Office of Cybersecurity “continuously monit rs systems for indications of a 
potential system compromise, and routinely identifies and blocks a number of potential 
attempts.”55  As of September 2018 (the latest date for which we have information), the Bureau 
knew of no “attacks from outsiders that resulted in th rd parties gaining access to non-public data 
                                                 
49  See id. at 6. 
50  See id. at 7-11. 
51  See id. at 11-12. 
52  See id. at 12, 15. 
53  Id. at 42. 
54  Id. 
55  Id. at 15. 
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without appropriate authorization.”56  Similarly, the Bureau had “not experienced a ‘major 
incident’ as that term is defined by OMB and FISMA” as of that date.57 
 
The Bureau did experience 371 breaches in which Bureau personnel who were not authorized 
users accessed or potentially accessed PII through J ne 2018.58  In general, these breaches 
occurred when staff in consumer response did not foll w internal procedures when 
corresponding with complainants or when staff in other offices sent individual emails including 
PII to the wrong person.59   
 
These data breaches may have been part of the reason why the previous Acting Director, Mick 
Mulvaney, placed a freeze on CFPB data as one of his first actions after his appointment.  
Specifically, on December 4, 2017, Mr. Mulvaney annou ced that he was freezing all collection 
by the Bureau of personal information, including loan level data, citing privacy and information 
security.60  In imposing the freeze, Mr. Mulvaney reportedly halted the collection of data that 
could trace back to either consumers or businesses.61  Approximately six months later, Mr. 
Mulvaney reversed course and announced that he intended to resume the collection of 
consumers’ personally identifiable information because an outside consultant had determined 
that the agency’s information security systems “appeared to be well-secured.”62   
 
Based on the outcome of that investigation, it appers that the problem with the data breaches 
has now been resolved.  Meanwhile, the Bureau’s data governance, privacy programs, and 
information security have recently undergone outside audits and other third-party evaluations.  
None of those audits or evaluations recommended any curtailment of or halt to CFPB data 
collections. 
 
For instance, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued an audit report on 
September 22, 2014, on the Bureau’s information and data practices.  GAO concluded in that 
report that the “CFPB [had] taken steps to protect the privacy of consumers and comply with 
requirements, restrictions, and recommended practices in the Dodd-Frank Act, Paperwork 
Reduction Act, Privacy Act, E-Government Act, and NIST Guidelines.”63  In its report, GAO 
issued a number of recommendations for improvement, but never advised halting the collection 
of data.64  Subsequently, the CFPB resolved each of those items o GAO’s satisfaction and GAO 
“closed” each recommendation.65 
 
                                                 
56  Id. 
57  Id. 
58  See id. 
59  See id. 
60  See generally June 7 Comment, supra note 25, at 19-20. 
61  See, e.g., Yuka Hayashi, New CFPB Chief Curbs Data Collection, Citing Cybersecurity Worries, WALL ST. 
J., Dec. 4, 2017. 
62  Evan Weinberger, CFPB to Resume Data Collection After Data Security Review, BLOOMBERG LAW 
BANKING DAILY , May 31, 2018. 
63  Government Accountability Office, Some Privacy and Security Procedures for Data Collections Should 
Continue Being Enhanced (GAO-14-758, Sept. 22, 2014), www.gao.gov. 
64  Id. at 65-66. 
65  See Data Report, supra note 12, at 17-18. 
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Similarly, the CFPB’s Inspector General (IG) has examined the Bureau’s data security annually 
and has never recommended any curtailment in data collections.  Most recently, starting in May 
2017, the IG issued several reports on data security at the Bureau.66  In one of these reports, the 
IG found that the Bureau’s information security program was operating at a level-3 maturity 
(consistently implemented), on a scale of 1 to 5, and that several of the program’s activities were 
operating at a higher level-4 maturity.  Despite room to improve, the CFPB’s cybersecurity 
readiness exceeded that of the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, the Securities & Exchange Commission, and the Department of the Treasury, which 
never stopped data collection.67  While the IG proposed improvements,68 it never recommended 
a halt to the Bureau’s data collection, whether for purposes of gathering PII or otherwise.  
Subsequently, the IG concluded as of February 2018 that “the CFPB [had] substantially 
developed, documented, and implemented a privacy program that addresses applicable federal 
privacy requirements and security risks related to collecting, processing, handling, storing, and 
disseminating sensitive privacy data.”69 
 
Finally, the CFPB underwent a Risk and Vulnerability Assessment in spring 2018 pursuant to an 
agreement with the Department of the Defense to identify potential gaps in cybersecurity 
controls.  The assessors found that the “Bureau’s security posture [was] well-organized and 
maintained” and issued no “Critical” findings and three technical recommendations.  
Subsequently, the CFPB finished the remediation of all three recommendations.70   
 
Based on these repeated findings and the successful conclusion of Acting Director’s data freeze 
investigation, we see no justification to cut back on CFPB data collections or the sharing of 
CFPB data based on privacy or data security concerns.  This is consistent with cybersecurity 
norms.  No other federal financial regulator had halted data onboarding in response to a data 
breach, and particularly not where its systems “appe red to be well-secured,” as is the case with 
the Bureau.71     
 
In short, there is no evidence of outstanding privacy or date security concerns that would justify 
scaling back the collection or sharing of data at the CFPB.   Given this lack of evidence, we have 
serious concerns that any effort to roll back CFPB data collections or sharing in the name of 
privacy or cybersecurity would be a smokescreen for paralyzing the core functions of the 
Bureau.  Given its documented level of preparedness, the CFPB should adhere to established 
cybersecurity norms and maintain the free flow of information into and within the Bureau. 
 
 
                                                 
66  See June 7 Comment, supra note 25, at 20 n.90.   
67  Warren Letter, supra note 23, at 4-5. 
68  See Data Report, supra note 12, at 18-20. 
69  Office of Inspector General, Report on the Independent Audit of the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau’s Privacy Program (2017-IT-C-008, Feb. 14, 2018), oig.federalreserve.gov. 
70  See Data Report, supra note 12, at 20. 
71  See Evan Weinberger, CFPB to Resume Data Collection After Data Security Review, BLOOMBERG LAW 
BANKING DAILY , May 31, 2018.  Instead, if a data breach occurs, federal agencies typically plug the leak as quickly 
as possible while resuming data collection.  Kate Berry, Mulvaney response to CFPB data security gaps baffles 
cyber experts, AM. BANKER, Apr. 23, 2018; Warren Letter, supra note 23, at 2-4. 
